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Abstract
Full-duplex communication enables simultaneous transmission from both ends of a communication
link, thereby promising significant performance gains. Generally, it has been shown that the throughput
and delay gains of full-duplex communication are somewhat limited in realistic network settings, leading
researchers to study other possible applications that can accord higher gains. The potential of full-
duplex communication in improving the physical-layer security of a communication link is investigated
in this contribution. We specifically present a thorough analysis of the achievable ergodic secrecy
rate and the secrecy degrees of freedom with full-duplex communication in the presence of a half-
duplex eavesdropper node, with both single-user decoding and multi-user decoding capabilities. For the
latter case, an eavesdropper with successive interference cancellation and joint decoding capabilities are
assumed. Irrespective of the eavesdropper capabilities and channel strengths, the ergodic secrecy rate
with full-duplex communication is found to grow linearly with the log of the direct channel SNR as
opposed to the flattened out secrecy rate with conventional half-duplex communication. Consequently, the
secrecy degrees of freedom with full-duplex is shown to be two as opposed to that of zero in half-duplex
mode.
Index Terms
Full-duplex, 5G, Physical-layer security, secrecy degrees of freedom, interference cancellation re-
ceivers, joint decoding.
I. INTRODUCTION
H ISTORICALLY, full-duplex communication, i.e. simultaneous transmission and receptionon the same radio resource, had been considered impractical due to the overwhelming
loopback interference from the transmission-end at the co-located receiver. Recent advances
in self-interference cancellation (SIC) allow suppressing this loopback interference to within
tolerable limits, thereby making full-duplex (FD) communication appealing with viable cost.
Ideally, FD communication has the potential to provide a 100% throughput gain over conventional
half-duplex (HD) transmissions, making it a candidate technology component in the design of a
novel fifth Generation (5G) radio access technology [1]–[3].
Until recently, most studies on FD communication have investigated its potential in according
a throughput gain [3]–[8], and/or improving the transmission latency [9], [10]. It has been shown
that the expected throughput gains are conditioned on three strong assumptions [11], namely i)
perfect SIC, ii) available traffic at both ends to exploit the arising transmission opportunities,
and iii) similar levels of network interference with FD and HD transmissions. Simultaneous
transmission from both ends leads to higher inter-cell interference (ICI) for a network of FD
nodes compared to conventional HD nodes [3], [6]. Such increased ICI, along with any residual
self interference power, results in a reduction of the possible throughput gains. Additionally
considering a practical downlink heavy traffic profile limits the instances where the simultaneous
transmission/reception capabilities of FD communication can be utilized, resulting in a further
reduction of the throughput gains [12], [13].
Due to the somewhat limited throughput gain and latency reduction, other potential applications
of FD communication have recently been investigated. The requirement of having symmetric
traffic in order to exploit FD opportunities have lead to studying FD transmission for scenarios
with symmetric traffic profile, such as backhaul communication [14], [15]. Relays are also
envisioned as a potential application area for FD communication. The use of relays in multi-
user FD communication systems is considered as an effective approach to improve spectral
efficiency and expand its coverage [16], [17]. A relay-aided interference cancellation technique
was proposed for a FD relay wireless networks in [16]; whereas the authors in [17] have proposed
a two-timeslot two-way FD relaying scheme for 5G wireless communication systems. In addition,
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some advances in throughput analysis and optimization of wirelessly powered multi-antenna FD
relay systems were demonstrated in [18].
The broadcast nature of wireless transmission makes it vulnerable to be eavesdropped and
raises potential security concerns. Information-theoretic physical-layer security approach focuses
on the inherent capacity of the propagation channel to provide security in the physical-layer
itself [19, and references therein]. Cooperative transmission via relays has been proposed as
an effective physical-layer security scheme [20]. The performance of secure FD relaying has
recently been analyzed for single hop [21] and multi-hop [22] relays. However, reference [21]
assumes non-negativity of the secrecy rate (which is valid only when the direct channel is much
stronger than the eavesdropper channel), whereas reference [22] assumes perfect SIC; both being
too optimistic as assumptions. Rather than either HD or FD mode, a new hybrid FD/HD relay
selection technique to improve the physical-layer security has been developed in [23]. The authors
in [24] have investigated the secrecy performance of FD relay networks demonstrating it to have
a better secrecy performance than HD relay networks in scenarios where self-interference can
be well suppressed. They further proposed a FD jamming relay network wherein the relay nodes
transmit jamming signals simultaneously as it receives the data from the source.
Physical-layer security with FD nodes for non-cooperative communication has started gaining
attention as well. A transmit beamforming scheme for a full-duplex base station (FD-BS) con-
sidering physical-layer security guarantee for the system with multiple passive eavesdroppers is
proposed in [25]. On the other hand, reference [26] investigates the potential of using FD jamming
receivers to improve physical-layer secrecy and robustness without the aid of external relays.
However, both of these contributions focus on developing a transmission scheme to optimize
the secrecy rate with simplistic assumptions limiting the applicability in realistic scenarios (e.g.,
strict achievability of positive secrecy rate as in [21]).
The authors in [27] have designed a joint information and jamming beamformer to ensure
security at both the ends for a FD-BS. Reference [28] considers a joint beamforming and power
optimization problem for multi-antenna full-duplex transmission systems. The authors propose
to utilize information bearing signals to additionally act as artificial noise against eavesdroppers,
and show that the overall throughput can be improved while simultaneously maintaining the
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desired secrecy and quality of service levels. On the other hand, the network requirements for a
FD-BS are addressed to secure the information being shared in a simultaneous information and
power transfer energy harvesting nodes in [29]. Furthermore, an underlay cognitive radio system
is considered in [30] wherein the secondary transmitter sends information to a FD receiver node
in presence of an eavesdropper. The receiver node is equipped with a power-splitter architecture,
allowing it to receive information as well as energy from the source. This received energy is
utilized to transmit jamming signals to deteriorate eavesdropper’s decoding capacity. The work
in [31] assumes a FD wiretap channel in the presence of an eavesdropper and imperfect channel
state information, and proposes techniques to maximize the achievable sum secrecy rate.
Key Contributions: The secrecy potential of FD communication, expressed in terms of the
ergodic secrecy rate and the secrecy degrees of freedom, is thoroughly analyzed in this contribu-
tion; and compared against that of an equivalent HD links. This article extends the state-of-the-art
on the physical-layer security potential of FD communication by specifically relaxing the strictly
positive secrecy rate constraint and considering non-ideal SIC. Both, a single-user decoding Eve
(SU-Eve) with passive linear receivers, and a multi-user decoding Eve (MU-Eve) with successive
interference cancellation (IC) and multiple access channel (MAC) joint decoding (JD) capabilities,
are both considered. In particular, the main contributions of this paper in specific terms are1
• We present a closed form expression for the ergodic secrecy rate of FD communication
considering different capabilities at Eve and non-ideal SIC,
• the strictly positive secrecy rate assumption is relaxed by allowing unconstrained eavesdrop-
per channel strength,
• the secrecy degrees of freedom of the considered scenarios are characterized, and
• applications of the findings in emerging 5G networks are discussed.
Paper Organization: Section II introduces the system model. Closed form expressions for
the ergodic secrecy rate upper bound, and the achievable secrecy rate gap with respect to the
upper bound when considering Eve equipped with IC and MAC JD capabilities are analyzed
in Section III. The secrecy degrees of freedom is then characterized in Section IV. Section V
discusses application of the derived findings in emerging 5G networks. Finally, numerical results
1Partial results of this work are presented in [32], [33].
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are presented in Section VI, followed by closing remarks and future outlook in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Information-theoretic security characterizes the fundamental ability of the physical-layer to
provide confidentiality. Let us consider a single small cell with an active transceiver pair, Alice
and Bob, in the presence of Eve - an eavesdropper, as shown in Figure 1. Alice intends to transmit
an encoded message W of coding block length n with rate R to Bob. The rate R is said to be
achievable with perfect secrecy with respect to Eve if, as n→∞ : (a) the probability of decoding
error at Bob vanishes, and (b) the uncertainty of the message W as observed at Eve approaches the
entropy of the message itself [19], [34]. Following [19], [35], we consider the secrecy capacity
of the Gaussian wiretap channel defined as difference between the source-destination and the
source-eavesdropper rate to be the achievable secrecy rate.
An isolated cell is considered in order to focus the analysis on FD communication. Each node
in the transceiver pair can operate in either FD or HD mode. When operating in FD mode, the
appropriate SIC schemes are assumed to limit the loopback self interference power to within
tolerable limits. The random variables Π ∈ {X, Y, Z} in Figure 1 denote the random signal-to-
noise-ratios (SNR) of the respective channels among Alice, Bob, and Eve. The realizations ϕ ∈
{x, y, z} of the respective random variable (rv) Π is represented as ϕ = ϕ̄ϕ̃, with ϕ̄ ∈ {µ, φ, ψ}
being the mean and ϕ̃ a unit mean rv similarly distributed as ϕ.
Fig. 1: System Model showing the considered FD transceiver pair in the presence of Eve.
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A. Signal Model
1) Desired Signal Power: With FD communication, the desired signal to interference plus
noise ratio (SINR) at Bob (and Alice) is denoted as
γFD =
X
I + 1
, (1)
where I denotes the noise-normalized residual self interference power after SIC at the receiver
end. In the case of HD nodes I = 0, and the SINR is simply given by the SNR, i.e., γHD = X.
Generally, the desired Alice-Bob link is part of the same system and hence system designers
have more information about, and control over, this link. The Nakagami-m fading distribution,
which is a general fading distribution that includes a wide range of other distributions as special
cases via its shape parameter m [36], is therefore adopted to model the desired signal amplitude.
The SNR X is correspondingly distributed according to the following gamma distribution [36]
fX(x;m,µ) =
mmxm−1
µmΓ(m)
exp
(
−mx
µ
)
, (2)
where the gamma distribution is characterized by the parameter m and the mean SNR µ, and
Γ(m) ,
∫∞
0
tm−1 exp(−t) dt is the Gamma function.
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X, defined as FX(x) =
∫ x
0
fX(t) dt is given by
FX(x;m,µ) =
γ
(
m, mx
µ
)
Γ(m)
, (3)
where γ (m,x) ,
∫ x
0
tm−1 exp(−t) dt is the lower incomplete Gamma function [37, 6.5.2].
2) Signal Power at the Eavesdropper Node: Without loss of generality, we assume Alice to
be the transmitting node in HD scenario. The eavesdropped message at Eve is received with the
SNR βHD = Y. In contrast, Alice and Bob transmit simultaneously in FD mode, resulting in an
additional source of interference at Eve. The resulting SINR of the eavesdropped message at Eve
from Alice and Bob are respectively given by
βa =
Y
Z + 1
, and βb =
Z
Y + 1
. (4)
Since the eavesdropper is usually an external node to the Alice-Bob system with more uncer-
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tainty about its location, the signal amplitude at Eve is assumed to follow the widely adopted
Rayleigh fading distribution. The SNR Y (and Z) with mean φ(ψ) are correspondingly distributed
according to the following exponential distributions [36]
fY (y) =
1
φ
exp
(
−y
φ
)
, and fZ(z) =
1
ψ
exp
(
− z
ψ
)
. (5)
The distribution of β: To derive the distribution of β2, we introduce the variable u = y
z+1
, and
marginalize over the rv z in order to obtain fβ(u|z) = fY (y(u)) dydu . The desired distribution of
β is thereafter obtained as fβ(u) = Ez[fβ(u|z)] = exp
(
−u
φ
)
/φEz
[
(z + 1) exp
(
−uz
φ
)]
, where
E[·] is the expectation operator. Following some algebraic manipulations, the probability density
function (PDF) is derived as
fβ(u) =
exp (−u/φ)
uψ + φ
[
φψ
uψ + φ
+ 1
]
. (6)
On a similar note, the CDF of β defined as Fβ(u) =
∫ u
0
fβ(t) dt evaluates to
Fβ(u) = 1−
exp (−u/φ)
1 + uψ
φ
. (7)
For the special case when Eve is equidistant from Alice and Bob (i.e. φ = ψ), the PDF and
the CDF can respectively be further simplified as
fβ(u) =
exp (−u/φ)
1 + u
[
1
1 + u
+
1
φ
]
,
Fβ(u) = 1−
exp (−u/φ)
1 + u
. (8)
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate
1) Secrecy Rate with HD: Assuming the maximal additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) rate
can be achieved at every resource slot, the desired achievable rate between Alice and Bob is
Rx = log (1 + x) , while the unwanted eavesdropped rate at Eve is Ry = log (1 + y) ; where the
logarithms are base 2. Following the definition of secrecy rate as the strictly positive difference
between the desired rate and the eavesdropped rate, the instantaneous secrecy rate in HD mode
2The index ∈ {a, b} is henceforth dropped as the usage is clear from the context.
7
is given by
SHD = max {Rx −Ry, 0}
=

log (1 + x)− log (1 + y) when x > y
0 otherwise.
(9)
2) Secrecy Rate with FD: Alice and Bob can communicate simultaneously with each other
when both are equipped with FD nodes, with both transmissions subject to potential overhearing
by Eve. The achievable rate between Alice and Bob can be expressed as Rab = log (1 + γFD) ,
where γFD is the SINR in FD mode as given by Eq. (1). Similarly, the achievable rate at Eve
considering the transmission from Alice to Bob is Rae = log (1 + βa) with βa given by Eq. (4).
The instantaneous secrecy rate of the Alice to Bob link with FD transmissions is then given by
SFD,a =

log (1 + γFD)− log (1 + βa) when γFD > βa
0 otherwise.
(10)
On a similar note, the instantaneous secrecy rate of the reverse Bob to Alice link with FD
transmissions is SFD,b = max {Rab −Rbe, 0} , where Rbe = log (1 + βb) . Finally, the instan-
taneous secrecy rate of the considered system with FD communication can be expressed as
SFD = SFD,a + SFD,b.
C. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom
The degrees of freedom of a wireless link is an indication of the capacity pre-log factor in
the capacity computation, and is an important information-theoretic measure [19], [38]. Being a
difference of two achievable rates, the achievable secrecy rate easily lends itself to degrees of
freedom analysis. More specifically, the secrecy degrees of freedom (sdof) region is a character-
ization of the high SNR behaviour of the secrecy capacity. Following [19], [39], we define the
sdof with the ratios ηφ , µφ and ηψ ,
µ
ψ
fixed as
dϑ = lim
µ→∞
sup
Sϑ
log µ
, (11)
where ϑ ∈ {HD,FD} is the transmission mode.
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III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
The first part of this section considers a SU-Eve equipped with a linear receiver, which
represents an upper bound on the achievable secrecy rate with FD communication. A more
advanced receiver at Eve capable of multi-user decoding is assumed in the following subsection.
A. Achievable Secrecy Rate Analysis with Single-User Decoding Eve: Upper Bound
1) Achievable Secrecy Rate Analysis for HD Communication: The achievable ergodic secrecy
rate can be obtained by averaging the instantaneous secrecy rate given in Eq. (9) over the
distributions of the rvs x and y, and is expressed as
S̄HD = E [SHD] = E [log(1 + x)− log(1 + y)] Pr[x > y]
= log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)fX(x)Pr[y < x] dx− log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y)fY (y)Pr[x > y] dy, (12)
where Pr[·] denotes probability, and FY (y) , 1− exp(−y/φ) is the CDF of Y.
The Meijer’s G function: Direct evaluation of the integrals in Eq. (12) is not straightforward.
Instead, we propose to utilize the Meijer’s G function, which is a highly general class of
integral function that can represent a wide variety of functions and lends itself to succinct
integral manipulations. The Meijer’s G function, designated by the symbol Gm,np,q [x], is defined
in [40, Eq. (5)]. The Meijer’s G function is widely adopted in the literature owing to its ease
of application and readily available software implementation in standard mathematical software
like Mathematica, Maple and Matlab [41].
The logarithm and the exponential function is represented in terms of the Meijer’s G function as
ln (1 + x) = G1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣1,11,0 ] and e−x = G1,00,1[x ∣∣−0 ] [40, Eq. (11)]. Using the above representa-
tions and [42, Eq. (07.34.21.0002.01)], the lower incomplete Gamma function γ(m,x) in Eq. (3)
can also be represented in terms of the Meijer’s G function as γ(m,x) =
∫ x
0
tm−1G1,00,1
[
t
∣∣−
0
]
dt =
G1,11,2
[
x
∣∣∣ 1m,0 ]. An integration involving the product of two Meijer’s G functions is also a Meijer’s
G function [40, Eq. (21)]. The solution to integrations involving the product of three Meijer’s
G functions is a Meijer’s G function of two variables expressed in terms of the extended
generalized bivariate Meijer’s G function (EGBMGF), as defined below [43, Eq. (8)], [42, Eq.
9
(07.34.21.0081.01)]∫ ∞
0
tα−1Gm,0p,q
[
ct
∣∣∣∣a1, . . . , apb1, . . . , bq
]
Gm1,n1p1,q1
[
c1t
∣∣∣∣a11, . . . , a1p1b11, . . . , b1q1
]
Gm2,n2p2,q2
[
c2t
∣∣∣∣a21, . . . , a2p2b21, . . . , b2q2
]
dt
= c−α Gm,0:m1,n1:m2,n2q,p:p1,q1:p2,q2
[
α + b1, . . . , α + bq
α + a1, . . . , α + ap
∣∣∣∣a11, . . . , a1p1b11, . . . , b1q1
∣∣∣∣ a21, . . . , a2p2b21, . . . , b2q2
∣∣∣∣ c1c , c2c
]
. (13)
Applications of the EGBMGF have been demonstrated in [44], [45], while its efficient imple-
mentations is readily available in Mathematica [44, Table II] and Matlab [46].
Lemma III.1. The achievable ergodic secrecy rate for half-duplex communication is presented
in terms of the Meijer’s G function and the EGBMGF as
S̄HD =
log(e)
Γ(m)
G1,33,2
[
µ
m
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1−m1, 0
]
−
(
1 + µ
mφ
)−m
ln(2)Γ(m)
G1,33,2
[
µφ
mφ+ µ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1−m1, 0
]
+
log(e)
Γ(m)
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,2
[
1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1m, 0
∣∣∣∣φ, mφµ
]
− log(e)G1,33,2
[
φ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 01, 0
]
. (14)
Proof. See Appendix A.
2) Achievable Secrecy Rate Analysis for FD Communication: With FD communication, the
total instantaneous secrecy rate of our single user system is the sum of the instantaneous secrecy
rates of both the communication directions, i.e.
SFD = max {log(1 + γFD)− log(1 + βa), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
SFD,a
+ max {log(1 + γFD)− log(1 + βb), 0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
SFD,b
. (15)
The average of SFD,a, the achievable secrecy rate for the Alice to Bob link, can be expanded
as
S̄FD,a =
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + x)fγFD(x)Fβa(x) dx+
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + u)fβa(u)FγFD(u) du
−
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + u)fβa(u) du, (16)
where the PDF and CDF of γFD follows from Eqs. (2) and (3) with µ replaced by the constant
mµ̃ with µ̃ defined as µ̃ = µ
(I+1)m
. The PDF and CDF of βa is derived in Section II-A.
Lemma III.2. The average achievable secrecy rate for the Alice to Bob link with full-duplex
communication and in the presence of a SU-Eve is presented in terms of the Meijer’s G function
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and the EGBMGF as
S̄FD,a =
log(e)
Γ(m)
G1,33,2
[
µ̃
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1−m1, 0
]
−
(
1 + µ̃
φ
)−m
ln(2)Γ(m)
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
m
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 00
∣∣∣∣ µ̃φµ̃+ φ, µ̃ψµ̃+ φ
]
−
2∑
α=1
µ̃ψα−1
ln(2)(µ̃+ φ)
m−1∑
n=0
(
1 + µ̃
φ
)−n
n!
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
n+ 1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1− α0
∣∣∣∣ µ̃φµ̃+ φ, µ̃ψµ̃+ φ
]
. (17)
Proof. See Appendix B.
Final Expression for S̄FD,a: Finally, the achievable ergodic secrecy rate for full-duplex com-
munication in the presence of a SU-Eve is
S̄FD = ¯SFD,a + ¯SFD,b, (18)
where S̄FD,b is similarly derived as in Lemma III.2 with ψ and φ replaced by each other.
3) Special Cases: In the special case when φ = ψ, the ergodic secrecy rate with FD commu-
nication for both directions are the same, resulting in S̄FD = 2S̄FD,a = 2S̄FD,b.
Moreover, if the Alice to Bob link is assumed to be Rayleigh distributed (i.e., m = 1) with Eve
equidistant from Alice and Bob, the ergodic secrecy rates for the HD and FD case respectively
reduces to
S̄HD = log(e)
{
G1,33,2
[
µ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 01, 0
]
−G1,33,2
[
µφ
µ+ φ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 01, 0
]}
, and (19)
S̄FD = 2 log(e)
{
G1,33,2
[
µ̃
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 01, 0
]
− κ
µ̃
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 00
∣∣∣∣κ, κ]
−κ
2∑
α=1
φα−2G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1− α0
∣∣∣∣κ, κ]
}
, (20)
where κ = µ̃φ
µ̃+φ
.
B. Achievable Secrecy Rate Analysis with Multi-User Decoding Eve
The channels from both Alice and Bob to Eve forms a multiple-access channel. In this section,
Eve is assumed to be equipped with successive interference cancellation capability. In addition,
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we apply MAC joint decoding for the eavesdropped rate at Eve for the instances when the
Alice/Bob to Eve channel is not strong enough to allow IC.
Alice and Bob are assumed to transmit to each other with fixed rates Ra and Rb respectively.
IC capabilities at Eve implies it is able to decode the message from Alice/Bob if received at a
rate greater than the transmission rate. Focusing on the Alice to Bob transmission link in FD
mode, let us define the eavesdropped rate REA at Eve pertaining to the MAC performance with
IC and JD. The eavesdropped rate measures the supremum of the achievable rate from Alice to
Eve for the transmission of rate Rb by Bob. Notice that the rate Rb is not necessarily decodable
by Eve. Given y, z, βa and βb, the eavesdropped rate is given by [34]
REA =

log(1 + y) if Rb ≤ log(1 + βb)
log(1 + y + z)−Rb if log(1 + βb) < Rb ≤ log(1 + z)
log(1 + βa) if Rb > log(1 + z)
, (21)
where the first two cases respectively represent the eavesdropped rate following IC and JD at
Eve. The corresponding secrecy rate pertaining to MAC performance is given by SMAC,a =
max (Ra −REA, 0) . The achievable rate REB and the corresponding achievable secrecy rate for
the Bob to Eve link can similarly be defined by interchanging the variables Ra with Rb, y with
z, and βa with βb.
An analysis of the loss in achievable secrecy rate with MU-Eve compared to that with SU-
Eve is presented in the following discussion. IC is investigated first, followed by MAC JD
considerations at Eve. The analysis considers the Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve links. Henceforth, we
assume Ra = Rb = R and introduce the constant R′ = 2R−1. The Alice to Bob link is assumed
to support the rate R, i.e., R ≤ log(1 + γ) for all channel realizations.
Successive Interference Cancellation Analysis
1) Probability of Successful IC: Let us first investigate the probabilities of successful IC at Eve.
We assume perfect IC whenever possible. Eve is able to apply IC for the Bob-Eve interference
channel given the rate log(1 + βb) ≥ R =⇒ z ≥ R′(y + 1) as pictorially depicted in Figure 2a.
The probability of successful IC is given by Pr[IC] = Pr[z ≥ R′(y + 1)], which readily evaluates
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to
Pr[IC] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
f(z)f(y) dz dy =
exp(−R′/ψ)
φλ
, (22)
where λ , R
′φ+ψ
φψ
. It can be straightforwardly shown that the probability of successful IC
approaches zero in the high SNR regime. The formal proof is omitted due to lack of space.
Instead, an outline is presented below.
In the high SNR regime, φ and ψ  1. Additionally, R′  1 provided R is selected to match
the channel conditions. Under normal operating conditions where φ and ψ are of similar order
of magnitude, we thus have φλ = 1 + R
′φ
ψ
 1. On the other hand, the numerator in Pr[IC] is
upper bounded by unity, i.e., exp(−R′/ψ) ≤ 1. Therefore, we readily observe that Pr[IC] → 0
under such conditions.
An exception can be observed when R′ is low while ψ  φ (Eve much closer to Bob than
Alice), in which case Pr[IC] will be non-negligible. However, the achievable secrecy rate defined
as (R− log(1 + y))+ in that case will mostly be zero owing to the fact that y  1 following the
high SNR regime assumption; and hence the impact of such successful IC on the secrecy rate is
nonetheless limited.
2) Achievable Secrecy Rate Gap: Unlike the high SNR regime, the probability of successful
IC is non-negligible in the SNR regime of practical interest, namely in the range of 0 ∼ 30 dB.
Let us analyse the loss in the achievable secrecy rate, i.e., ∆SIC = SFD,a − sMAC,a with IC at
Eve under such circumstances. For this analysis, we further assume R′ ≥ 1, which is mostly
true in the operating regime of interest. R′ < 1 is not an interesting scenario as it leads to low
secrecy rates in any case.
Assuming R′ ≥ 1, the conditions for successful IC implies non zero secrecy rate with SU-Eve,
i.e. z ≥ R′(y+1) =⇒ y ≤ R′(z+1). When y ≤ R′, MU-Eve and SU-Eve both result in non zero
secrecy rates, with the secrecy rate gap expressed as ∆SIC = log(1+y)−log(1+ y1+z ). On the other
hand, y > R′ means zero secrecy rate with MU-Eve. Correspondingly ∆SIC = R− log(1+ y1+z ),
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as shown in Figure 2a. The average secrecy rate can thus be expressed as
¯∆SIC = R
∫ ∞
R′
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
f(z)f(y) dz dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
L1
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
log(1 + z)f(z)f(y) dz dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
L2
+
∫ R′
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
log(1 + y)f(z)f(y) dz dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
L3
−
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
log(1 + y + z)f(z)f(y) dz dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
L4
. (23)
The integrals L2, L3 and L4 in Eq. (23) can either be solved using the techniques outlined in
Appendix A or using suitable numerical integration techniques as outlined in [37, Ch. 25]. In order
to reveal better insights, we instead propose to estimate each of these three integrals with their
upper bound obtained by applying Jensen’s inequality. Following some algebraic manipulation,
the secrecy rate gap resulting from IC at Eve can subsequently be estimated as
¯∆SIC ≈ L1 + log (1 + ẑ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L2
+ log(1 + ÿ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L3
− log(1 + ŷ + ẑ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L4
, (24)
where
L1 =
R exp (−R′λ+R′/ψ)
φλ
,
ŷ ,
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
yf(z)f(y) dz dy =
exp (−R′/ψ)
φλ2
,
ÿ ,
∫ R′
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
yf(z)f(y) dz dy =
exp (−R′/ψ)
φλ2
[1− (1 + λR′) exp(−λR′)] ,
ẑ ,
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
R′(y+1)
zf(z)f(y) dz dy =
exp (−R′/ψ)
φλ2
[R′(1 + λ) + λψ] .
Joint Decoding Analysis
1) Probability of Successful JD: The successful JD region is characterized by the region
R′ ≤ z < R′(y + 1) for all y as depicted in Figure 2b. Hence, the probability of successful
JD is given by
Pr[JD] =
∫ ∞
0
∫ R′(y+1)
R′
f(z)f(y) dz dy =
R′ exp(−R′/ψ)
ψλ
. (25)
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(a) IC regions of interest. (b) JD regions of interest.
Fig. 2: Pictorial depiction of the conditions leading to a positive (+ve) secrecy rate and successful
IC and MAC JD at Eve.
Unlike the probability of successful IC, the probability of successful JD is not negligible under
most SNR conditions.
2) Achievable Secrecy Rate Gap with JD: The gap in the achievable secrecy rate with MAC
joint decoding is briefly discussed in this section. Figure 2b depicts the regions under which JD
is possible and translates to a positive secrecy rate. Two different regions are of interest. Firstly,
the triangular region characterized by R′ ≤ z < R′(y + 1) and y + z ≤ R′′ , 22R − 1 represents
the scenario where JD is possible and results in a non-negative secrecy rate. The secrecy rate
gap in this case is R − log(1 + βa)− (2R − log(1 + y + z)) = log(1 + z)− R. The rest of the
area where JD is possible pertains to zero secrecy rate following JD, in which case the secrecy
rate gap is simply R− log(1 +βa). The ergodic secrecy rate loss resulting from MAC JD at Eve
can be estimated following similar steps as in Section III-B. The straightforward derivation is
omitted herein in the interest of brevity and space.
Preliminary Numerical Validation
Numerical validation of the IC/JD success probabilities and the secrecy rate gap estimations
are briefly discussed in this section. The success probability with IC and MAC JD for R = 2
and R = 10 bps/Hz are shown in Figure 3a followed by the corresponding average secrecy rate
gap in Figure 3b. Only the Alice to Bob link is considered. Two different channel conditions are
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addressed, a moderate SNR scenario of φ = ψ = 20 dB and a high SNR scenario where φ = 30
dB and ψ = 40 dB.
The probability of successful IC at Eve is found to be negligible for R = 10 (high R) as
discussed earlier in this section. Moreover, Figure 3b reveals that the higher successful IC
probability at low R translates to an negligible secrecy rate gap as indicated in the foregoing
discussion. The rate loss with JD at Eve is non-negligible at higher values of R. The behaviour
of this rate gap in the asymptotically high SNR regime is discussed in Section IV-C.
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Fig. 3: Numerical validation of the IC/JD success probabilities and the secrecy rate gap
estimations with an IC and MAC JD capable MU-Eve.
IV. SECRECY DEGREES OF FREEDOM ANALYSIS
The exact secrecy capacity region is difficult to obtain under most interference conditions. The
secrecy degrees of freedom, which measures the pre-log factor of the achievable secrecy rate
at high SNR cases, is usually investigated instead. Though a considerably coarse measure, the
sdof analysis is tractable and provides valuable insights into the secrecy capacity behaviour in
the asymptotic high SNR regime.
A. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom Analysis of Half-Duplex Communication
In HD mode, the instantaneous achievable secrecy rate is given by SHD = max{log(1 + x)−
log(1 + y), 0}. In the asymptotic SNR regime log(1 + x)− log(1 + y)→ log(x
y
) as {µ, φ} → ∞
with fixed ηφ = µφ , which in turn implies
lim
{µ,φ}→∞
SHD = lim
{µ,φ}→∞
(log(1 + x)− log(1 + y)) Pr[x > y] < log
(
x
y
)
.
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Observing the rv x
y
, we can deduce that Pr[x
y
< θ] = Pr
[
y > x
θ
]
= EX
[
exp
(
− x
θφ
)]
, where
the last step follows from the complimentary CDF of the exponential rv Y. The preceeding
expectation is by definition the Laplace Transform (LT) of the gamma distributed rv X, and is
given by MX(s) = EX [exp (−sx)] =
(
1 + µs
m
)−m [36]. Substituting the above result, we obtain
Pr[x
y
< θ] =
(
1 +
ηφ
mθ
)−m
. Using this formulation, it can be deduced that, in the asymptotic SNR
regime, Pr[x
y
<∞] = 1 as long as the ratio ηφ is bounded. We therefore have
lim
{µ,φ}→∞
SHD <∞, (26)
i.e., the instantaneous secrecy rate with HD communication is asymptotically bounded for a
bounded ηφ. Consequently, with a bounded instantaneous secrecy rate, the sdof of HD commu-
nication is by definition zero, i.e.
dHD = lim
µ→∞
sup
SHD
log µ
= 0. (27)
B. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom Analysis of Full-Duplex Communication with SU-Eve
The instantaneous achievable secrecy rate in FD mode is given in terms of the SINRs γFD, βa
and βb since SFD = max{log(1 + γfd)− log(1 + βa), 0}+ max{log(1 + γfd)− log(1 + βb), 0}.
To derive the sdof, let us look into the involved SINR figures, namely γFD, βa and βb, in the
asymptotic regime. We can observe from Eq. (7) that, by letting {φ, ψ} → ∞, with the ratios
ηφ and ηψ = µψ fixed (which also implies bound
φ
ψ
), the SINRs βa and βb remain bounded. In
other words, for fixed φ
ψ
, Pr[βa <∞] = Pr[βb <∞] = 1.
On the other hand, we can rewrite the SINR of the Alice to Bob channel as γFD = xI+1 =
µx̃
I+1
,
where x̃ is a unit mean gamma distributed rv. This allows us to present the achievable secrecy
rate SFD,a of the Alice to Bob link in the asymptotic SNR regime as
lim
{µ,φ,ψ}→∞
SFD,a = max
{
log(µ)− log
(
(1 + βa)(I + 1)
x̃
)
, 0
}
= log(µ)− ξa, (28)
where ξa <∞ is a constant. Similarly, it can be shown that the achievable secrecy rate SFD,b of
the reverse Bob to Alice link in the asymptotic SNR regime is lim{µ,φ,ψ}→∞ SFD,b = log(µ)− ξb,
with ξb <∞ being a constant. Consolidating the above discussion, the sdof with FD communi-
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cation with SU-Eve can be derived as
dFD = lim
µ→∞
sup
SFD,a + SFD,b
log(µ)
= lim
µ→∞
2 log(µ)− ξa − ξb
log(µ)
= 2. (29)
Hence, we can observe that the dof of FD communication is fully maintained even in the
physical-layer security aspect, i.e the dof [47] and sdof in FD mode are the same. This is in
contrast with conventional HD communication, where the dof is fully lost when the secrecy rate
is considered [19].
C. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom Analysis of Full-Duplex Communication with MU-Eve
We have observed in Section III-B that the secrecy rate loss is negligible with interference
cancellation capabilities at Eve. Hence the sdof with IC capable Eve remains unchanged. On the
other hand, the rate gap with MAC joint decoding capable Eve is non-negligible. In this section,
we show that this non-negligible rate gap is independent of the SNR, and hence vanishes when
normalized by the log(SNR) in the asymptotically high SNR limit. Let us assume that Alice to
Bob rate R is selected to support the instantaneous SNR γ, i.e., R = log(1 + γ).
1) Probability of Positive Secrecy Rate with JD at Eve: Joint Decoding at Eve results in a
positive secrecy rate when log(1 + y + z) ≤ 2R =⇒ y + z ≤ R′′. At high SNR R → log(γ),
and hence R′′ = 22R − 1→ γ2. Thus we have, Pr[y + z ≤ R′′]→ Pr
[
ỹ
ηφ
+ z̃
ηψ
≤ µ
(
x̃
I+1
)2]
. In
the asymptotic limit as µ → ∞, this probability is one almost surely since ηφ, ηψ and x̃I+1 are
bounded as µ→∞.
2) Asymptotic Rate Gap with JD at Eve: Since, Pr[y+ z ≤ R′′]→ 1 and R = log(1 + γ), the
rate gap with JD at Eve as derived in Section III-B2 is given by ∆SJD = log(1+z)− log(1+γ).
In the asymptotically high SNR limit, ∆SJD → log(z/γ). As a result, we have
lim
µ→∞
∆SJD
log(µ)
→ lim
µ→∞
log
(
z̃(I+1)
x̃ηψ
)
log(µ)
→ 0.
It is thus readily observable that the rate gap with JD at Eve does not impact the sdof since it
vanishes when normalized by SNR in the asymptotic SNR limit.
Hence, the secrecy degrees of freedom of full-duplex communication are unaffected in the
presence of MU-Eve with interference cancellation and MAC joint decoding capabilities.
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V. APPLICATIONS OF THE SECRECY RESULT FINDINGS
Applications of the derived findings in emerging 5G systems is discussed in this section.
A. Applications in Device to Device Communication
Alongside the conventional cellular connection between the base station and the user equipment,
5G systems may well support an additional device-tier architecture for direct communication
among the devices. In fact, direct device-to-device (D2D) communication is envisioned as a
key technology solution towards accommodating the demanding KPI targets of 5G [48]. FD
communication has been proposed for such D2D communications, especially considering the
close range of the devices and the symmetric nature of the traffic profile in both transmission
directions [49]. FD capability is also found to allow faster device discovery for D2D nodes [50].
Security is an important technical challenges in D2D communication. Cellular networks have
a certain degree of inherent security features such as authentication, integrity and access control.
Due to its very nature, D2D communication cannot guarantee the same level of security as do
cellular networks. The communicating parties must be assured that their data is not accessible to
any unwanted nodes in the vicinity. The findings presented in this work demonstrate that a very
high degree of physical-layer security can be achieved by enabling FD communication between
the D2D nodes. Hence, alongside the desirable gains in terms of throughput, latency, and device
discovery time, FD can also enhance physical layer security in D2D communication.
B. Applications in Cellular Networks with BS FD
Despite the potential benefits of FD communication, it may not be readily available for com-
mercial deployment at the UE level in the recent future due to size, power, and cost constraints.
An intermediate proposal is to enable the base stations with FD capabilities, and is known as
the base station full-duplex (BS-FD) architecture [1].
The investigations in this contribution have revealed that the simultaneous transmission from
both end of a FD communication link is the main contributor to the enhanced physical-layer
security. Such a finding can be utilized to accord protection to an UE scheduled in the uplink
direction with strong physical-layer security requirement in a BS-FD network.
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In the downlink direction, the FD capable BS can schedule an UE in close vicinity of the uplink
UE, as depicted in Figure 4. The eavesdropped signal at any eavesdropper in the vicinity of the
scheduled uplink UE will be masked by the simultaneous downlink transmission to another nearby
UE, thereby resulting in the strong secrecy rate demonstrated in this paper. Such interference-
assisted secret communication has earlier proposed for the conventional HD network (e.g. [51, and
references therein]). However, the downlink scheduled UE would also be affected by the uplink
transmission. The transmission in the downlink direction must therefore be either artificial noise,
or transmitted with a sufficiently low data rate. Thus, enhanced security for the BS-FD network
setup is achieved at the expense of sacrificing the downlink data rate of the secondary link.
C. Applications in Conventional HD Cellular Networks
The concept of scheduling users to enhance the secrecy rate can be further extended to
conventional HD networks as shown in Figure 4. An UE scheduled in the uplink direction
with strong physical-layer security requirement can be concurrently scheduled with a nearby UE,
also in the uplink direction. Let us term the two UEs as the protected and the protecting UE
respectively. If the BS is equipped with interference cancellation or interference suppression type
receivers, the traffic of both the UEs can be simultaneously decoded with a well designed radio
resource management technique and/or with the aid of IC and JD at the base station. Alternatively,
the protecting UE can be scheduled with traffic that is already known at the BS, which would
make the resulting interference easily treatable.
Fig. 4: Enhancing Physical-layer security though scheduling to induce a FD-like scenario at the
eavesdropper node.
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VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
The ergodic secrecy rate, the sdof and the throughput analysis of FD and HD communication are
numerically validated through Matlab R© based Monte Carlo simulations in this Section. At least
100, 000 independent snapshots of each scenario are simulated to ensure statistical reliability.
Unless stated otherwise, the following general simulation parameters are assumed to reflect a
typical propagation scenario: gamma parameter for the desired signal channel m = 2, the noise-
normalized residual self interference I = 1 and Eve equidistant from Alice and Bob, i.e. φ = ψ.
A. Ergodic Secrecy Rate as a Function of µ and φ
The ergodic secrecy rate of FD and HD communication for different ratios of the desired and
eavesdropper channel SNR (i.e. µ
φ
) with respect to (w.r.t.) the mean SNR µ are presented in
Figure 5. Weak, medium, and strong eavesdropper channels are considered, corresponding to
µ
φ
= [10, 0, and −10] dB. First of all, FD is found to considerably enhance the physical-layer
secrecy rate over conventional HD communication. This is due to the simultaneous transmission
from both the transmitter and the receiver, which generates an additional source of interference at
the eavesdropper. The resulting interference acts as a natural deterrent to eavesdropping attempt
at Eve, thereby enhancing the physical-layer security potential of FD communication.
Secondly, it is interesting to note that the ergodic secrecy rate in FD mode is almost independent
of the strength towards the eavesdropper channel, especially at high SNR values. In contrast, the
ergodic secrecy rate with HD is strongly dependent on the eavesdropper channel strength relative
to the desired channel, and is found to approach zero for large values of µ
φ
.
Finally, the slope of the ergodic secrecy rate curves are also distinctly different for FD and
HD communication. In conventional HD mode, the ergodic secrecy rate is found to flatten out
and converge to a constant as µ → ∞. On the other hand, the ergodic secrecy rate with FD
communication is observed to grow linearly with a fixed slope w.r.t. µ (in dB). This confirms
the analysis presented in Section IV that the sdof is 2 with FD whereas it is 0 with HD
communication.
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Fig. 5: The ergodic secrecy rate of FD and HD communication for different values of µ and φ.
B. Ergodic Secrecy Rate as a Function of Fading Parameter m
The impact of the Gamma fading parameter m on the ergodic secrecy rate is investigated in
this subsection. The ergodic secrecy rate for m = 1 and m = 2.5 with different mean SNR values
w.r.t ηφ = µφ is presented in Figure 6. Gamma parameter m = 1 corresponds to a Rayleigh faded
channel, while m = 2.5 reflects a channel with relatively lower amount of fading.
Similar to the findings observed in Figure 5, the ergodic secrecy rate with FD is found to be
almost constant w.r.t. ηφ. Moreover, there is a huge gain of a factor of around 10 in the ergodic
secrecy rate as µ is increased from 10 dB to 30 dB. Finally, the amount of fading is found to
have only a slight impact on the ergodic secrecy rate, with the ergodic secrecy rate increasing
with increasing m (i.e., as the fading gets less severe). It is worthwhile to note that the derived
analytical results match perfectly with the simulation results in most cases. However, since the
lower incomplete gamma function was approximated by its nearest integer m for non-integer m
in deriving the ergodic secrecy rate in FD mode, we can observe a slight gap for m = 2.5 at
low ηφ values.
The observations for the conventional HD mode once again reveal the potential of enhancing
the physical-layer security with FD communication. Firstly, the ergodic secrecy rate in HD mode
is found to be strongly dependent on eavesdropper channel. Furthermore, the impact of the desired
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Alice to Bob channel SNR is less pronounced in this case with only a slight gain in the ergodic
secrecy rate as µ is increased from 10 dB to 30 dB.
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Fig. 6: The ergodic secrecy rate of FD and HD communication w.r.t. ηφ , µφ for different mean
SNR (µ) and m values.
C. Ergodic Secrecy Rate as a Function of the Residual Self Interference Power I
The noise normalized residual self interference power I is an important parameter for FD
communication. In this subsection, we explore its impact on the ergodic secrecy rate. The ergodic
secrecy rate corresponding to perfect SIC (I = 0), SIC to the level of noise floor (I = 1) and
I = 10 are presented w.r.t. µ in Figure 7. Furthermore, asymmetricity in the eavesdropper channel
is also considered by choosing ψ/φ = [2, 5], while ηφ is set at 10 dB.
First of all, asymmetricity in the eavesdropper channel, i.e., having φ 6= ψ, has little impact on
the ergodic secrecy rate, especially at higher values of µ. In contrast, the residual self interference
power plays an important role. In fact, for lower values of µ, the ergodic secrecy rate in FD mode
is lower than that of HD mode with I set to 10 dB. This reiterates the well know maxim for FD
communication that significant gains with FD communication requires a strong direct link (i.e.,
large µ) and sufficient isolation of the self interference power. Though not shown in Figure 7,
the plots for different I values are found to converge to the same secrecy rate as µ→∞, which
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conforms to the finding presented in Section IV that the sdof in FD mode is independent of the
residual self interference power I.
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Fig. 7: The ergodic secrecy rate of FD and HD communication w.r.t. µ for different values of
the self interference power I.
D. Ergodic Secrecy Rate With Advanced Receiver at Eve
The ergodic secrecy rate considering a MU-Eve with successive interference cancellation and
MAC joint decoding capabilities for different configurations are shown in Figure 8. Two cases
are considered, namely φ = ψ = 2µ, and φ = 2µ, ψ = 10µ. Both represent scenarios where Eve
is closer to Alice/Bob than themselves - with conditions conducive for IC/JD. As discussed in
Section III-B, the loss in the secrecy rate with only IC at Eve is minimal. On the other hand,
that with MAC JD at Eve is not negligible, though the gap does not grow with the SNR. This
is also manifested in the sdof analysis presented in Section IV-C.
E. Secrecy Degrees of Freedom Results
Being an asymptotic SNR characterization of the secrecy rate, the sdof is not readily amenable
to numerical simulations. However, to demonstrate the validity of the analysis presented in
Section IV, the behaviour of max S
log(µ)
is presented in Figure 9 as a function of the mean
SNR µ in logarithmic value for different values of the residual self interference power I. It
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Fig. 8: The ergodic secrecy rate of FD communication with SU-Eve and MU-Eve, I = 5 dB.
is observed that as µ → ∞, the ratio of the secrecy rate over the SNR in logarithmic value
converges to two for FD communication, even with advanced receiver at Eve (indicated by IC
+ JD at Eve). On the other hand, limµ→∞ maxSlog(µ) approaches zero in the HD mode. Hence, the
reported respective sdof with FD and HD communication is clearly evident from the presented
trend.
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Fig. 9: The secrecy rate normalized by log of SNR in the asymptotic SNR range.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
A thorough analysis of the potential of full-duplex communication in enhancing the physical-
layer security of a wireless link is presented in this contribution. A closed form expression for the
ergodic secrecy rate has been derived considering the Nakagami-m fading model. Single-user, and
multi-user decoding eavesdropper with successive interference cancellation and joint decoding
capabilities, are both considered. The finding is presented as a function of the eavesdropper
channel strength and residual self interference power. A characterization of the secrecy rate
in the asymptotic high SNR regime, namely the secrecy degrees of freedom, is also presented.
Finally, comprehensive numerical results via simulations demonstrating the validity of the derived
results have been presented. The analytical findings are found to closely match the simulation
results in all scenarios, thereby validating the accuracy of the analysis and the presented results.
Contrary to the limited throughput gain potential, FD communication is found to provide a
high degree of physical-layer security. Specifically, the ergodic secrecy rate with full-duplex
communication is found to grow linearly with the log of the direct channel SNR as opposed
to the flattened out secrecy rate with conventional half-duplex communication, irrespective of
the eavesdropper channel strengths. Such compelling secrecy rates are found to be valid even
with strong residual self interference power and under moderate SNR conditions. In fact, the
sdof, i.e., the pre-log factor of the secrecy rate is found to be two compared to that of zero
with conventional HD transmissions. As part of the future work, we plan to extend our study
by analysing other physical-layer security metrics such as the secure outage probability and the
strictly positive secrecy probability, and consider a FD Eve with active jamming capabilities.
APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE ERGODIC SECRECY RATE WITH HD COMMUNICATION
The achievable ergodic secrecy rate given by Eq. (12) can be expanded as
S̄HD = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)fX(x)FY (x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J1
+ log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y)fY (y)FX(y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
J2
− log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y)fY (y) dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
J3
. (30)
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1) Evaluating J1: Substituting FY (y) = 1− exp(−y/φ) in Eq. (30), we obtain
J1 = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x) (1− exp(−x/φ)) fX(x) dx
= log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)fX(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J11
− log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x) exp(−x/φ)fX(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
J12
. (31)
Further substituting fX(x) given by Eq. (2) and isolating the integral J11, we obtain
J11 = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)
mmxm−1
µmΓ(m)
exp
(
−mx
µ
)
dx
=
log(e)mm
µmΓ(m)
∫ ∞
0
xm−1G1,00,1
[
mx
µ
∣∣∣∣−0
]
G1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
dx
=
log(e)
Γ(m)
G1,33,2
[
µ
m
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1−m1, 0
]
, (32)
where the last step is obtained following [40, Eq. (21)].
Following similar steps, J12 in Eq. (31) is evaluated in terms of the Meijer’s G function as
J12 = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + x)
mmxm−1
µmΓ(m)
exp
(
−
(
m
µ
+
1
φ
)
x
)
dx
=
(
1 + µ
mφ
)−m
ln(2)Γ(m)
G1,33,2
[
µφ
mφ+ µ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1−m1, 0
]
. (33)
2) Evaluating J2: The integral J2 in Eq. (12) can be expanded as
J2 = log(e)
∫ ∞
0
ln(1 + y)
1
φ
exp
(
−y
φ
)
γ(m, ym/µ)
Γ(m)
dy
=
log(e)
φΓ(m)
∫ ∞
0
G1,22,2
[
y
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
G1,00,1
[
y
φ
∣∣∣∣−0
]
G1,11,2
[
my
µ
∣∣∣∣ 1m, 0
]
dy, (34)
where the last step results from substituting the logarithm, the exponential and the lower incom-
plete gamma functions with their respective representation in terms of the Meijer’s G function.
The integral J2 can be expressed in closed form in terms of the EGBMGF as
J2 =
log(e)
Γ(m)
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,2
[
1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1m, 0
∣∣∣∣φ, mφµ
]
. (35)
3) Evaluating J3: The last integral J3 in Eq. (30), which reads J3 =
log(e)
φ
∫∞
0
ln(1+y) exp (−y/φ)
can be solved following similar steps as in Eq. (32) by substituting m = 1 and µ = φ. The
27
resulting expression for J3 is
J3 = log(e)G
1,3
3,2
[
φ
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 01, 0
]
. (36)
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF THE ERGODIC SECRECY RATE WITH FD COMMUNICATION
The average achievable secrecy rate of the Alice to Bob link in FD mode given by Eq. (16)
can be expressed as a sum of integrals as follows
S̄FD,a =
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + x)fγFD(x)Fβa(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
K1
+
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + u)fβa(u)FγFD(u) du︸ ︷︷ ︸
K2
−
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + u)fβa(u) du︸ ︷︷ ︸
K3
. (37)
1) Evaluating K1: Using Eqs. (2) and (7), the integral K1 in Eq. (16) can be expanded as
K1 =
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + x)fγFD(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
K11
−
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + x)e(−
x
φ)
(
1 +
xψ
φ
)−1
fγFD(x) dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
K12
. (38)
Following the steps involved in evaluating J11, the integral K11 is solved as
K11 =
log(e)
Γ(m)
G1,33,2
[
µ̃
∣∣∣∣1, 1, 1−m1, 0
]
. (39)
On the other hand, the second integral K12 can be expanded as an integration involving a
product of three Meijer’s G functions; with a close form solution in terms of the EGBMGF
defined in Eq. (13) as follows
K12 =
log(e)
µ̃mΓ(m)
∫ ∞
0
xm−1 exp
(
−
(
1
µ̃
+
1
φ
)
x
)
ln(1 + x)
(
1 +
ψ
φ
x
)−1
dx
=
log(e)
µ̃mΓ(m)
∫ ∞
0
xm−1G1,00,1
[(
1
µ̃
+
1
φ
)
x
∣∣∣∣−0
]
G1,22,2
[
x
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
G1,11,1
[
ψ
φ
x
∣∣∣∣00
]
dx
=
(
1 + µ̃
φ
)−m
ln(2)Γ(m)
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
m
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 00
∣∣∣∣ µ̃φµ̃+ φ, µ̃ψµ̃+ φ
]
, (40)
where the second step follows from the relation (1 + cx)α = 1
Γ(−α)G
1,1
1,1
[
cx
∣∣α+1
0
]
[40, Eq. (10)].
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2) Evaluating K2: Substituting the respective gamma CDF and the PDF of the SINR β at
Eve from Eq. (6), the integral K2 is expanded as a product of four distinct terms that can be
represented as four different Meijer’s G functions. However, an integration involving four terms
of Meijer’s G function is not readily solvable. To overcome this limitation, we proposed to restrict
the gamma parameter m to be a an integer. Please note, the solution in the case of a non-integer m
value can be approximated by replacing m with its closest integer. In that case, we can represent
the CDF of γFD using the recurrence relation γ(m+1, x) = mγ(m,x)−xm exp(−x) for integer
positive m as γ(m,x) = Γ(m)
(
1− exp (−x)
∑m−1
n=0
xn
n!
)
[37, Eq. (6.5.13)].
Subsequently, the integral K2 is solved as
K2 =
∫ ∞
0
log(1 + u)
(
1− exp
(
−u
µ̃
)m−1∑
n=0
un
µ̃nn!
)
fβa(u) du = K3 −K ′2, (41)
where
K ′2 =
2∑
α=1
ψα−1
φ
m−1∑
n=0
1
µ̃nn!
∫ ∞
0
un ln(1 + u) exp
(
−
(
1
µ̃
+
1
φ
)
u
)(
1 +
ψ
φ
u
)−α
du
=
2∑
α=1
ψα−1
φ
m−1∑
n=0
1
µ̃nn!
∫ ∞
0
unG1,00,1
[(
1
µ̃
+
1
φ
)
u
∣∣∣∣−0
]
G1,22,2
[
u
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
]
G1,11,1
[
ψ
φ
u
∣∣∣∣1− α0
]
du
=
2∑
α=1
µ̃ψα−1
ln(2)(µ̃+ φ)
m−1∑
n=0
(
1 + µ̃
φ
)−n
n!
G1,0:1,2:1,11,0:2,2:1,1
[
n+ 1
−
∣∣∣∣1, 11, 0
∣∣∣∣ 1− α0
∣∣∣∣ µ̃φµ̃+ φ, µ̃ψµ̃+ φ
]
. (42)
Substituting K1 and K2 into Eq. (37) yields the final expression for S̄FD,a in Eq. (17).
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